Shareholders of Allied Gold Corp. voted in favour of China’s Zijin Gold International Co. Ltd.’s proposed $5.5 billion acquisition of the company last week.
Industry Minister Mélanie Joly reviews all proposed foreign takeovers of Canadian companies in case of national security vulnerabilities. The reviews include assessing how the deals will affect Canada’s defence capabilities, critical supply chains, and the potential for enabling foreign espionage.
(Sidebar: this moron? God ...)
The Canadian government had a 45-day window to raise concerns about the deal, but it did not do so, meaning it was approved by default. The government would still be able to block Zijin’s acquisition of Allied if it fails to pass the ongoing net economic benefit review, which examines the deal’s impact on the Canadian economy, jobs, and supply chains.
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada said in a statement to The Epoch Times that the government is aware of the transaction, but said it can’t comment on specific transactions due to confidentiality provisions in the Investment Canada Act.
Zijin, which has indirect ties to the Chinese regime through its ownership structure, struck a deal in January to acquire Allied for $44 per share in cash—an all-time high for the stock. Allied operates mines in the African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Mali, and produces around 375,000 ounces of gold a year.
Neither of the companies responded to The Epoch Times’ request for comment.
Under former prime minister Justin Trudeau, Ottawa tightened rules on Chinese ownership in the Canadian mining sector, citing national security concerns over China’s growing control of the global critical minerals supply chain. The Canadian government was particularly concerned about Chinese control of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
Canada has typically allowed Chinese investment in Canada’s gold sector in recent years, as the metal is not classified as a critical mineral. But in 2020, Ottawa blocked Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd.’s attempted acquisition of TMAC Resources Ltd. TMAC’s mine is located near tidewater in the Northwest Passage, which is a strategic shipping route in the Canadian Arctic.
Since Mark Carney became prime minister in early 2025, he has moved to strengthen ties between Ottawa and Beijing in a bit to diversify trade away from the United States. During a visit to China in January, Carney announced he was reducing tariffs on imports of Chinese electric cars, and said Canada was open to more investment from China.
Mark Carney poses with Respon head Hong Wei 'Winnie' Liao.
— Andy Lee (@RealAndyLeeShow) April 10, 2026
Liao held lavish cash for access fundraisers with Chinese Communist Party members with Trudeau in 2016.
One of her triplets, Yun 'Lucy' Li, was arrested for murdering her business partner.
Perfect Carney supporters. https://t.co/S935sHn7uR
In policing — particularly in national security and organized crime — we are trained to recognize a simple truth: the most serious threats rarely arrive with warning. They emerge gradually, through relationships, dependencies, and decisions that appear rational in isolation but carry strategic consequences in aggregate.
What concerns me today is not a single incident or headline. It is a pattern.
Consider the sequence.
In September 2024, Mark Carney assumed a central role shaping Canada’s economic future as Chair of the government’s Task Force on Economic Growth. Weeks later, he met with a senior official from the People’s Bank of China. Shortly thereafter, Brookfield — an entity with which he has longstanding ties — secured a loan of roughly $250 million from the state-owned Bank of China.
There is no allegation of illegality here. But in national security work, legality is not the threshold. Exposure is. Influence is. Perception is. And when public authority and private financial interests intersect — particularly involving foreign state institutions — it raises questions that deserve clear answers.
Now turn to Newfoundland.
The Beaver Brook mine is not just another industrial site. As The Bureau has reported, it is North America’s most significant source of antimony — a mineral essential to ammunition, advanced weapons systems, and modern defense technologies. China owns it. And in 2023, it was shut down.
Since then, Beijing has tightened global supply through export controls, driving prices sharply higher while Western governments scramble to secure independent sources. The United States has responded with billions in strategic investment. Canada has not.
In policing, when a critical asset is controlled by a foreign state actor and rendered inactive in a way that benefits that actor strategically, we do not assume coincidence. We assess leverage.
The same dynamic is emerging in Canada’s Arctic.
Chinese state-linked enterprises hold significant mineral positions in Nunavut. At the same time, Ottawa is accelerating infrastructure projects — roads, ports, and corridors — that will define access to those resources for decades to come. Infrastructure is not neutral. It determines who operates, who profits, and ultimately, who holds influence on the ground.
If Canadian-funded infrastructure enhances the operational reach of foreign state enterprises — particularly those aligned with strategic competitors — we must ask whether we are strengthening sovereignty or quietly diluting it.
Layer onto this the growing body of evidence around foreign influence operations.
A recent international study identified hundreds of organizations in Canada connected to China’s United Front system — an apparatus designed to shape political and social environments abroad. Canada’s own Foreign Interference Commission has heard credible concerns about relationships between political actors and networks aligned with Beijing’s interests.
This is not about ethnicity or diaspora communities. It is about state-directed influence — deliberate, persistent, and strategic.
What is most troubling is not any single element, but the inconsistency across them.
Canada identifies China as a strategic challenge. Yet strategic minerals remain under foreign state control. Public funds support foreign state-linked enterprises. Domestic industries are bypassed in key procurements. National security considerations appear disconnected from economic policy.
In my experience, organized systems — whether criminal or state-based — do not need to overpower institutions. They exploit gaps. Inconsistencies. Misalignments between stated priorities and actual decisions.
Right now, Canada is presenting those gaps.
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