We Don't Have to Trade With China

Need one be reminded?:

Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat and Chinese detainee, weighed in on Canada’s newly announced trade arrangements with China following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s meetings with President Xi Jinping this week.

In a series of social media posts on Saturday, Kovrig, who spent more than three years in the Chinese Communist Party’s custody following the arrest of a Huawei executive in 2018, warned that the long-term risks could outweigh the short-term economic relief.

On Friday, Carney announced a deal that would allow 49,000 Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles (EVs) into Canada annually at a tariff rate of six per cent, down from the 100 per cent tariff announced by the previous Liberal government in lock-step with the previous U.S. administration. In exchange, China has agreed to reduce tariffs on some Canadian canola products, excluding canola oil, and certain seafood products from between 25 and 85 per cent to either zero or 15 per cent.

In one post on X, Kovrig said the visit, the first by a Canadian prime minister since 2018, “was never just a courtesy call.” He posited that China was in search of tangible wins on EV access, energy and political cooperation.

“With Canada–U.S. relations under strain, the General Secretary smelled blood in the water and seized a moment of increased leverage,” Kovrig wrote.

“Carney secured limited relief for farmers and reopened dialogue channels, but Xi kept his pressure tools and is sure to keep using them.”

The mistake is thinking that this is a trade deal.

It is not.

**

 

WATCH: Canadian journalist confirms that members of the press have been forced to carry "burner phones" for the first time while in China, out of concern that the CCP will spy on delegation members.

Q: Is China really the right kind of partner for Canadian industry?"

Joly:… pic.twitter.com/yHPDrCX32g

— Harrison Faulkner (@Harry__Faulkner) January 15, 2026

**

In April 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney was standing on the stage of the federal election leaders’ debate when he was asked to identify the greatest threat to Canada’s national security.

Without hesitation, Carney declared: “China.”

On Thursday, Carney stood at a podium in Beijing’s Ritan Park and beamed as he announced a new “strategic partnership” with China that aims to increase trade, communication and collaboration between both countries.

It also makes a strong push for Chinese EV investments in Canada with the eventual objective of having a manufacturing plant established in Canada.

If the swing in tone gives you whiplash, you’re not alone. So, what changed in those nine months?

It’s hard to tell.

Ask Carney if he still believes China to be the greatest threat to Canada’s national security and he’ll skirt the issue.

That’s despite concerns that the technology in the vehicles could be used by China to spy on users and pose a threat to foreign countries’ national security. …

In the meantime, the public service’s concerns about security while in China were certainly obvious from the start of the trip.

One hour before Can Force One entered Chinese airspace Wednesday, all public servants and political staff were required to power down their usual work and personal devices and stash them in a Faraday bag.

While in Beijing, they all used “burner” devices, which were promptly returned as soon as the delegation’s plane left Chinese airspace Saturday.

There’s no need to use burners in Qatar and Switzerland — the next stops on the eight-day trip — showing that not all allies are on equal security footing.

** 

In early November, the Israeli Defense Forces made a decision that sent ripples through defense and cybersecurity circles worldwide: withdraw every Chinese-manufactured vehicle from its senior officer fleet. The IDF marked approximately 700 cars, predominantly the Chery Tiggo 8 Pro model, for removal by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

This wasn’t a routine fleet upgrade. The IDF’s Chief of Staff ordered the recall after national security agencies concluded that these vehicles posed an unacceptable espionage risk. The concern wasn’t hypothetical damage—it was the potential for sensitive information leakage and intelligence collection that could compromise military operations.

Before the recall, the IDF had already prohibited Chinese cars from entering military bases. Security officials attempted to neutralize the threat by “sterilizing” the vehicles’ multimedia systems to prevent external data transmission. They failed. The risk, they concluded, couldn’t be fully eliminated through technical workarounds. No public evidence of actual data breaches emerged, but for military planners, the possibility alone was enough.

The move places Israel alongside the United States and United Kingdom, where Chinese technology faces similar restrictions in high-security environments. The message is clear: the threat is real enough to warrant drastic action.

What Makes a Car Dangerous

Israeli cyber experts don’t call these vehicles “cars with connectivity issues.” They call them “mobile intelligence platforms.” The distinction matters.

A modern vehicle runs on a closed operating system with extensive wireless connectivity. Inside that chassis: cameras, microphones, sensors, and communications systems capable of collecting audio, video, geolocation, and biometric data. These systems can transmit information remotely to external servers—potentially located in China—without the driver’s knowledge or the importer’s consent.

The built-in GPS receivers and telematics control units constantly broadcast location data, driving behavior, and vehicle diagnostics. For senior military officers, this creates an unintended surveillance network. Tracking these vehicles in real time could reveal army mobilizations, operational patterns, classified locations, and secure installations.

The Chery Tiggo 8’s high-definition 360-degree cameras add another layer of vulnerability. These cameras could inadvertently capture details about military exercises, troop movements, or critical infrastructure like missile defense installations. The primary concern isn’t that these systems are actively spying—it’s that they could be hacked to provide unauthorized access to this aggregated intelligence.

**

The secret police join forces:

Carney and Xi ink MOU on "Cooperation in Combating Crimes Between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China." Wanna bet Ottawa will honor this MOU, unlike the BS one it inked with Alberta?https://t.co/4S2BGrsxHO

— Perilous Times (@_periloustimes_) January 17, 2026