Sunday, March 20, 2022

Speaking of Georgia ...

An interesting view here:

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, whatever results there are, be they the defeat of Ukraine or Russia’s inability to impose its will on Kyiv, will have tremendous effects on the wider Black Sea region, and indeed the European security architecture as a whole. And Georgia is one to watch here, as yet another country which was promised NATO membership back in 2008 and which was mentioned in Russia’s radical demands made to the West in December last year. ...

Should Russia achieve basic, however pyrrhic, success in Ukraine, Georgia could be facing Russian demands of officially reneging on its engagement with NATO and the EU. Faced with this potential challenge, Tbilisi will have little political, military or economic power to withstand such ultimatums or even military moves, with Russian occupation forces in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions serving as decapitation power against Georgia’s resolve.

This quite naturally begs the question of what the collective West, and especially the US, could do to help Georgia avoid direct military threats from Russia and build more resilient ties between Tbilisi and the West. A crucial question is whether the country is within America’s defense perimeter.

 

What would the West do in this case?

What the West did before: nothing. 

If the US is asking China to intervene in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and has relaxed its stance on Iran, how confident could one be that Georgia will be left unmolested or otherwise completely unaffected by the fallout?

 


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